顶刊推送《China Journal of Accounting Research》2021年第14卷第4期

Abstract: According to classic corporate governance theory, strengthening large shareholders’ cash flow rights without changing their control rights should reduce expropriation incentives by better aligning their interests with those of minority shareholders. However, due to the weaker investor protections and low dividend payouts of listed firms in China, large shareholders typically extract private benefits instead of seeking shared benefits through dividends. They therefore care more about control rights than cash flow rights. An empirical study using the exogenous changes of two rounds of dividend tax reductions reveals that strengthening the largest shareholders’ cash flow rights leaves their expropriation activities unchanged and firm value does not increase. However, when other shareholders supervise the largest shareholder, expropriation activities ease significantly.

Keywords: Corporate governance, Dividend tax, Expropriation, Firm value, Large shareholders

2.Is pledge risk matched between pledgees and pledgers in China’s share pledge market?

Deren Xie

Tsinghua University, Beijing, China

Mengyu Zhang

Tsinghua University, Beijing, China

Abstract: Based on a sample of share pledging by the controlling shareholders of A-share listed firms, we investigate whether pledge risk is matched between pledgees and pledgers in China’s share pledge market. The results show that, compared with broker pledgees, commercial bank pledgees accept pledged stocks with lower market risk and the corresponding listed firms are at lower risk, have higher levels of information transparency and are more likely to be state-owned enterprises (SOEs). We also find that commercial bank pledgees do not ease the risk requirement of pledged stocks for pledgers of SOEs. Further, we document that commercial bank pledgees face lower margin call risks than broker pledgees. After securities companies were authorized to compete in the share pledge market in 2013, the pledge risk faced by commercial bank pledgees further reduced. Our results support that China’s share pledge financing market generally achieves an efficient equilibrium in terms of pledge risk matching between pledgees and pledgers. We recommend that the macro control of share pledge risk be focused on broker pledgees.

Keywords: Share pledge, Pledgees, Pledgers, Risk matching

3.Does preventive regulation reduce stock price synchronicity? Evidence from Chinese annual report comment letters

Xiaomin Hao

Economics and Management School, Wuhan University, China

Yonghai Wang

Economics and Management School, Wuhan University, China

Abstract: Based on a sample of Chinese A-share listed firms from 2015 to 2018, this paper studies the impact of annual report comment letters (ARCLs) on firm stock price synchronicity. We find that after firms receive ARCLs, their stock price synchronicity decreases. Moreover, the longer the ARCLs and the more negative the ARCLs’ tone, the lower the resulting stock price synchronicity. The mechanism test shows that after firms receive ARCLs, the firms’ information disclosure increases in quantity and quality, external media attention increases, and the firms’ governance improves, reducing their stock price synchronicity. Further research shows that this negative association is more significant in firms with higher information asymmetry. This paper shows that the ARCL, an innovative application of the capital market supervision philosophy, is conducive to improving the quality of listed firms and to the healthy development of the capital market.

Keyword: Preventive Regulation, Annual Report Comment Letters, Stock Price Synchronicity, Information Asymmetry

4.The pricing and performance of IPOs in China’s poor counties

Chao Yan, Jiaxin Wang

School of Accounting, Zhongnan University of

Economics and Law, China

Abstract: In the context of China’s drive to alleviate poverty, we focus on the initial public offering (IPO) firms located in China’s poor counties and investigate their IPO pricing and post-IPO performance. Contrary to the findings reported for the U.S., we find that the problem of information asymmetry between Chinese firms located in rural areas and their investors is so severe that these IPO firms are associated with significantly higher underpricing. This effect is more pronounced for firms located in rural areas with poor traffic systems. We do not find significant market performance differences between rural and urban firms after their IPOs, but the operating performance of rural firms improves in the short term. Our additional analyses indicate that rural IPO firms have significantly lower investor attention and higher agency costs than urban firms. Overall, we enrich the literature on IPO pricing and the economic effects of geographic location.

Keywords: Poor counties, IPO pricing, Performance, Information asymmetry

5.The role of accounting conservatism in M&A target selection

Qingquan Tang, Jingjing Guo, Zhihong Huang

School of Business, Sun Yat–sen University, China

Abstract: Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are among the most important investment activities for companies, but they contain great risks. We investigate the role of accounting conservatism in M&A target selection and risk. We find that for risk-averse reasons, firms with high accounting conservatism are likely to acquire profitable targets and avoid loss-making targets. When such firms acquire loss-making targets, the conservatism’s risk-control role reduces M&A risk and increases M&A performance, but only when control of the target is transferred and the acquirer has high long-term debt and low management power. Furthermore, accounting conservatism reduces risk by increasing the maturity match between cash flow and debt. Our results suggest that accounting conservatism plays not only a risk-averse role but also a risk-control role, providing new evidence for the usefulness of accounting conservatism in M&A decisions.

Keyword: Target selection, Accounting conservatism, Risk aversion, Risk control

6.Are zombie firms more incentivized to financialize?

Haomin Wu

School of Accounting, Yunnan University of

Finance and Economics, Kunming, Yunnan, China

Meng Yang

School of Economics and Management,

Shihezi University, Shihezi, Xinjiang, China

Jun Gu

Department of Accounting & Research Center for Finance and Accounting, College of Economics, Shenzhen University, Shenzhen, Guangdong, China

Abstract: This paper investigates whether zombie firms demonstrate a tendency to invest in the financial sector, a practice we term financialization strategy. Unlike those in the United States, Japan, and Europe, we find that zombie firms in China are not necessarily small and that they rely heavily on government subsidies in addition to bank loans for survival. In addition, we document that zombie firms in China experience limited investment opportunities in their core businesses. This combination of readily available funding and limited investment opportunities jointly motivate the financialization of firms with zombie status. We further find that financialization is preferred by non-state-owned firms and by those located in regions with less developed markets. Finally, we suggest that a contagion effect can occur in terms of financialization in provinces that have a high percentage of zombie firms. This research sheds light on the effects of a triangular relationship among firms, government agencies, and financial institutions on both the operations of individual firms and overall market efficiency.

Keywords: Zombie firms, Financialization, Spillover effect, Government subsidies

来源：https://www.sciencedirect.com/journal/china-journal-of-accounting-research

收集人：傅树童暨南大学硕士

审核人：胡伟燕天津财经大学硕士

编辑：石庚岩信阳师范学院硕士

编辑团队成员名单：

李欣颖青海民族大学会计

张澳湖南大学大四会计学

石庚岩信阳师范学院研二会计学

吴伟浙江工商大学会计学研三

王萃芳东北财经大学企业管理博二

王俊苏重庆理工大学 MPACC 研一